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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY ANN LUCERO
DIPOMA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Appellate No. 990526-CA
Category No. 15

BRIAN McPHIE and DOES I
through 20, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE UNKNOWN,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

The following is written in reply to the Brief of Appellee filed October
21,1999.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Dipoma would dispute the statement made by Appellee in
the "Statement of the Case" that "the Clerk of the Court notified Dipoma of
the same [that her check had been returned] shortly thereafter." (Appellee's
Brief, p. 2). It should be noted there is no citation to the record for this
assumption which is utilized by Appellee to argue that Dipoma did not act
promptly upon notification of the check problem. The Statement of

Undisputed Factsfiledby the Appellee (R. 16-17) and the Appellant (R. 2930) did not indicate when Dipoma was notified of the returned check.
Likewise, the Docketing Statement also does not indicate any date of
notification to Dipoma.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY
DETERMINED THAT DIPOMA'S CAUSE OF
ACTION WAS NOT COMMENCED ON
NOVEMBER 27,1997.
Appellant Dipoma relies upon her opening Brief to support her
contention that the lower court erred in holding as a matter of law that she
had failed to meet the statute of limitation requirement because her initial
filing fee check subsequently was dishonored. Appellant will, however,
briefly address several arguments and citations raised by the appellee in his
responsive brief.
It is apparent that there is a split of authority between state jurisdictions
and federal circuits in the interpretation of problems involvingfilingfees and
commencement of actions. Since this exact issue has not been decided in
Utah, cases cited by both parties are helpful but do not control the
interpretation of Utah law. It should also be noted that this case does not
involve an instance where a litigant has attempted to file a complaint with a
2

clerk but has been refused because the litigant would not tender a proper
filing fee. Here, the case was commenced with a District Court number, a
judge was assigned, and the judicial process continued in all respects
identical to any other case filed in the District Court. Thus, the question of
"filing" and the question of "payment" are similar but nevertheless distinct.
Appellee relies upon Title 21 of the Utah Code Annotated relating to
the obligation of clerks to accept fees prior tofilingdocuments. While this
title clearly governs the duties of public servants it does not affect a court's
determination of jurisdiction for purposes of a statute of limitation defense.
In essence, if a potential litigant does not have the correct fees at the time of
attempting to file a complaint the District Court Clerk may by statute refuse
to process the paperwork until such fee is paid. This governmental fee statute
is not jurisdictional for purposes of commencing a civil action.
In Foley v. Foley, 147 Cal. App.2d 76 (Cal. App. 1956) an argument
similar to Appellee's was made. A California statute required clerks to
collect fees in advance. A litigant failed to pay a filing fee timely but the
clerk still accepted the papers andfiledthem. The fees were not paid until
after the statutory period had expired forfilingof the original papers.
The California Appellate Court found thefilingdate effective even
though the fee was not paid within the statutory period. The Court
3

emphasized there was no indication that the legislature intended thefilingbe
rendered void if thefilingfee was not timely paid. The Court said:
If it had been the legislative intent that the effectiveness of certain
official acts would depend on the payment of fees by the persons interested in
them, a provision directed to those interested persons and in our case
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure would have been expected. Id. at
78.
The appellee acknowledges that Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure
controls the determination of when an action commences. (Appellant's Brief,
at 6, 7). This rule does not discuss the payment of fees in any way. It is
therefore necessary for the appellee to utilize the governmental internal
statutes contained in Title 21 to argue that the term "filing" does not occur
"until the mandatory filing fees have been paid." (Appellee's Brief at 7). Just
as the Foley court observed, if payment of afilingfee is in fact jurisdictional,
it would have been included in the language of Rule 3 and A—it was not.
Another provision of Utah law also supports Dipoma's position. Rule
3 provides that an action can be commenced "by service of a summons
together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4." Rule
4(c)(2) states, "If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons
shall state that the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed
within ten days after service

" Thus, under Utah Rules the time for
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measuring a statute of limitation defense can occur upon the service of a
summons when no complaint or fee has beenfiledwith the Clerk.
Obviously, both Rules 3 and 4 are written with exact detail which must
be followed if an action is to be correctly commenced. Failure to do so will
result in lack of jurisdiction. Lock v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111 (Utah, 1955);
Martin v.Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975); Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288
(Utah 1986); Dennett v. Powers, 536 P.2d 135 (Utah 1975); and Fibreboard
Paper Products v. Ditrich, 475 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1970). Certainly, the
jurisdictional requirement of afilingfee could easily have been included in
Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellee notes that Rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure specifically requires, "the party obtaining the review shall pay to
the Clerk of the Appellate Court suchfilingfees as are established by law and
also the fee for docketing the appeal." (Appellee's Brief at 12-13). This
Court in Hausknect v. Industrial Comm'n, 882 P.2d 683 (Utah App. 1994)
declined to read into the rule "language limiting the jurisdictional effect of
failure to comply." Here, any jurisdictional requirement of afilingfee is also
notably absent from Rule 3 and Rule 4.
It is unnecessary to elaborate in this particular case whether a litigant
could demand a court clerk to file a complaint without a fee and without
5

signing an affidavit of impecuniosity in order to satisfy the statute of
limitation requirement. Here, a filing fee was in fact paid and accepted by the
Court Clerk in the form of a check and the complaint was filed, stamped, and
assigned a case number. This undisputed factual scenario, therefore, is
completely different from the cases relied upon by Appellee (In De-Gas,
Boostrom, and Wanamaker, Appellee's Brief at 8-11) where the clerk refused
to accept the complaint until afilingfee had been tendered. In all of those
cases the actual filing of the complaint was not accomplished until after the
statute of limitations had run.
Even assuming arguendo as the appellee contends that the payment of
afilingfee is a necessary prerequisite to determine when a statute of
limitation time is calculated, the question remains in this case what effect
does payment by check have upon this requirement. Using Appellee's logic,
for example, would delay the actualfilingdate of any complaint by several
days since even checks that clear with no problem do not fund the state
account on the date of the filing. In some instances, a check may require a
week before funds are actually poured into the District Court' account.
Should thefilingdate, therefore, be adjusted to the actual day that funds are
received into the Clerk's account?
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Clearly, such a delayed calculation would be absurd and not based
upon any rule or statute. This same principle is equally applicable to
dishonored checks. In other words, for purposes of Appellee's argument it is
immaterial whether a good check requires three days to clear or whether a
bad check requires seven days to make good the funds. In both cases neither
date is the date that the complaint isfiledand date stamped.
As noted in Appellant's opening Brief if the legislature and the
supervisory courts of this state wish to require that payment of actual funds
be made concurrently with thefilingof a complaint then the various rules and
statutes should require cash be paid. The use of certified funds, checks, or
credit cards all require a time delay in the actual receipt of funds into the
Clerk's account.
The appellee has apparently been unable tofindany other case
involving a returned check except for the Brokerhouse International case from
the Colorado Court of Appeals. (Appellee's Brief at 7-8). Appellant would
submit that a review of this half-page decision relating to this issue does not
clarify the question of "payment" at all but is merely a legal conclusion
without any analysis. In essence, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined
that the payment of a docketing fee only occurs when cash is received by the
Clerk.
7

Appellee has not addressed the argument that the conditionalfilingfee
by check or credit card is no different than the conditional granting of
impecunious status until a determination by a court. (Appellant's Brief at 1920). When a date offilingis critical, equal protection does not allow the
treatment of a claimed impecunious litigant to be any different than that of a
paying litigant. There is no Utah statute or rule which requires a date of filing
of a complaint to change if the affidavit of impecuniosity of a litigant is later
denied. Instead, the litigant must pay the fee upon such denial with no effect
upon thefilingdate. The fact that a check is dishonored and must also be
subsequently paid should also have no effect upon the originalfilingdate.
Finally, the appellee argues that as a matter of law Dipoma failed to
pay thefilingfees within a reasonable time even assuming that she timely
filed her complaint. (Appellee's Brief at 14-18). If the question of
"reasonableness" of her action is to be addressed it should be in the district
court where evidence may be taken. The appellate cases cited by the
appellee all involve an initial determination by a lower court as to the
reasonableness of the litigant's actions. This same procedure should be
followed here. The question as to what notices Dipoma received, what she
was told to do by the Clerk's office, and the entire time sequence should be
evaluated by a trier of fact before any legal conclusion of law can be reached.
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Clearly, any issue of reasonable time is one of fact which should be
remanded if such issue is deemed relevant by this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, appellant Dipoma respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the order of dismissal entered in this case.
DATED this 22nd day of November, 1999.
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